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Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
Jennifer A. Blackburn"
and Courtney E. Ferrell***
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012,
during which principles of administrative law were either illuminated
or formed an important piece of the decision making.' For a change, the
Authors observed a significant increase in the number of reported cases
during the survey period, but that increase does not necessarily indicate
a trend. No attempt has been made to survey cases that properly would
fall under categories of more specific articles in this issue, although some
degree of overlap is inevitable because of shared subject matter.
This Article begins with a discussion of cases on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Statutory construction is the next topic,
followed by cases discussing discretionary appeals, and then standards
of review of an agency decision. The last topic for the survey of
appellate cases is sovereign immunity, and the Article concludes with a
brief review of enactments from the 2012 regular session of the Georgia
General Assembly.

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., with honors, 1978).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.A., 2000); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2004).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College
& State University (B.A., 2004); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia administrative law during the prior survey period, see
Martin M. Wilson & Jennifer A. Blackburn, AdministrativeLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 63 MERCER L. REv. 47 (2011).
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EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed the well established rule that
judicial review of a final agency decision is available only where all
In Alexander v.
administrative remedies have been exhausted.
Department of Revenue,' the trial court found that "Alexander did not
exhaust his administrative remedies because he failed to ask the
Commissioner [of Revenue] to review the initial decision before it became
final. 4 Alexander argued he could not have sought review of the initial
decision by the commissioner because section 50-13-41 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)5 does not expressly provide for
such review.6
While the statute itself does not specifically discuss "an aggrieved
party applying to an agency for review of the decision of an administrative law judge," it clearly allows for an agency to undertake such a
review.7 The court determined that if an agency is authorized to take
on such reviews, aggrieved parties would most certainly have the ability
to request such reviews themselves.' Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 50-13419 provides that "decision[s] of an administrative law judge shall be
treated as an initial decision" and O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1710 allows for
applications to an agency for review of an initial decision in contested
cases.'
Because Mr. Alexander failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him, the court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal
12
of his petition for judicial review.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
At times, the central issue in an administrative law case relates to the
agency's construction of the governing statute that it is charged with
administering. In Palmyra Park Hospital v. Phoebe Sumter Medical
Center,3 the Georgia Court of Appeals consolidated several cases

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Alexander v. Dep't of Revenue, 316 Ga. App. 543, 545, 728 S.E.2d 320, 322 (2012).
316 Ga. App. 543, 728 S.E.2d 320 (2012).
Id. at 544, 728 S.E.2d at 321.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41 (2009).
Alexander, 316 Ga. App. at 544, 728 S.E.2d at 321.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41.
O.C.G.A. § 50-13-17 (2009).
Alexander, 316 Ga. App. at 544,728 S.E.2d at 321; see also O.C.G.A. § 50-13-41(d).
Alexander, 316 Ga. App. at 545, 728 S.E.2d at 322.
310 Ga. App. 487, 714 S.E.2d 71 (2011).
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appealing two superior court decisions in which the court granted a
hospital certificate of need (CON) issued by the Georgia Department of
Community Health (DCH). 14 In granting Palmyra Park Hospital's
(Palmyra) CON application to provide basic perinatal services, DCH
relied on a 2008 amendment to the CON statute providing that, for
perinatal services, where there is only one facility in the applicant's
county and fewer than three facilities in the contiguous counties, need
provision is commonly referred
does not have to be established.1 This
" 16
to as the "Areawide Need Exception.
On appeal, DCH asserted that "the trial courts erred in failing to defer
to DCH's interpretation of the statute and in concluding that DCH
exceeded its statutory authority by improperly expanding the scope of
the Areawide Need Exception . .. ."" The superior court determined
that DCH's argument about the apparent legislative intent to create a
"'choice' of basic perinatal providers in enacting the Areawide Need
Exception" was erroneous. 8 Further, the superior court found DCH
"exceeded its statutory authority by determining that the presence of a
choice of providers was a factor that affected other considerations in [the
statute] .19
While the court of appeals acknowledged the superior court's
observation that "the 'plain language' of the statute merely removes from
consideration the existence of 'need,"' the court determined DCH did not
improperly extend the exception to other considerations and instead
simply considered the effects of the Areawide Need Exception in its
analysis.2 ° Well established Georgia law requires the trial court to
defer to such statutory interpretations by an agency.2 Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's order reversing DCH's grant
of Palmyra's CON application.22
The point in time in which a "planned interchange" becomes an actual
"interchange" is speculated in Eagle West, LLC v. Georgia Department

14. Id. at 487, 714 S.E.2d at 72.
15. Id. at 488, 714 S.E.2d at 72; see also O.C.GA. § 31-6-42(b.2) (2012).
16. PalmyraParkHosp., 310 Ga. App. at 489,714 S.E.2d at 73; see also O.C.G.A. § 316-42(b.2).
17. Palmyra ParkHosp., 310 Ga. App. at 490, 714 S.E.2d at 74. In response to DCH's
argument, the court of appeals noted, "[tihe cardinal rule in statutory construction is to
ascertain the legislature's intent and effectuate the purpose of the statute." ld. at 495, 714
S.E.2d at 77.
18. Id. at 498, 714 S.E.2d at 79.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 496, 714 S.E.2d at 78.
21. Id. at 496, 714 S.E.2d at 77-78; see also O.C.G.A. § 31-6-42(b.2),
22. PalmyraPark Hosp., 310 Ga. App. at 499, 714 S.E.2d at 80.
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3 Eagle West, an applicant
of Transportation."
for an outdoor advertising sign, cleverly asserted that the statutory provision prohibiting signs
from being erected within 500 feet of an interchange does not include
interchanges that are under construction but not yet completed. 24 The
Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) denied Eagle West's
application for permits to erect and maintain outdoor advertising signs
adjacent to Interstate 95' under the Outdoor Advertising Control
Act,26 which prohibits signs from being erected or maintained "adjacent
to an interstate highway within 500 feet of an interchange.... .2 The
administrative law judge (ALJ)reversed the DOT's decision, finding that
the plain language of the statute restricted the location of signs within
500 feet of an interchange, 28 but did not apply to a proposed or future
interchange. 9 The ALJ rejected the DOT's assertion that they were
authorized to deny the permit application because the interchange was
planned and all preconstruction work had been completed on the
project.30
The DOT deputy commissioner reversed the ALJ's decision, finding
that the interchange was not only planned but nearly completed because
construction is the final phase of a lengthy approval process."'
Affirming the DOT's final agency decision, the superior court held:
"[Once the location of an interchange is publicly announced, [the DOT]
is authorized to deny requests for permits to build signs at or adjacent
to the site of the interchange which would violate the limitations
32
imposed by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75(a)(18)."
On discretionary appeal, Eagle West argued that the statutory
language "within 500 feet of an interchange" is plain and unambiguous
and clearly does not include planned or future interchanges. 38 The
rules of statutory construction require the cited clause be reviewed in
the "context of the statutory provision in which it is found," as well as
in "related statutory provisions[, to determine the] legislative scheme as

23. 312 Ga. App. 882, 720 S.E.2d 317 (2011).
24. Id. at 883, 720 S.E.2d at 319.
25. Id. at 882, 720 S.E.2d at 319.
26. O.C.G-.A §§ 32-6-70 to -97 (2012).
27. O.C.GA § 32-6-75(a)(18).
28. Eagle West, 312 Ga. App. at 883, 720 S.E.2d at 319; see also O.C.G.A. § 32-675(a)(18).
29. Eagle West, 312 Ga. App. at 883, 720 S.E.2d at 319.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Id. at 884, 720 S.E.2d at 320.
33. Id. at 885, 720 S.E.2d at 321; see also O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75(a)(18).
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a whole.'&Noting the statute fails to include modifiers such as "operational," "paved," or "fully constructed" to support Eagle West's argument,
the court of appeals held that the General Assembly did not intend to
limit the word "interchange" by leaving its meaning so plain and
unambiguous that it only applied to constructed interchanges.3 5
Because the DOT deputy commissioner's denial of the permit application
was consistent with the Outdoor Advertising Control Act, the decision
was affirmed.36
In Northeast Georgia Cancer Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Georgia, Inc.,"v the issue was whether the "Any Willing Provider"
(AWP) statute applied to the PPO network owned by Blue Cross and
Blue Shield or the HMO network owned by BC Healthcare.38 Under
the rules of statutory construction, the Commissioner of Insurance
decided the AWP statute applied to both the PPO and HiMO networks.3 9
Based on the plain and unambiguous language of the AWP statute
together with relevant statutes, the court of appeals determined there
was support for the Commissioner's decision as to the PPO network, but
not for the HMO network.4' While the Commissioner applied the same
rules to both the PPO and HMO networks, the HMO network is a
separate, for-profit network.4 ' A plain reading of the Insurance Code
provides that AWP provisions are not applicable to for-profit corporations, such as the BC Healthcare HMO network.4 2 Because of the clear
intent of the statute, the court held the Insurance Commissioner's
decision was erroneous.43
This section concludes with a case in which the Georgia Supreme
Court appears divided on the proper application of the rules of statutory
construction, with the majority relying heavily on legislative intent and
the dissent citing the plain language of the statute. In Cardinalev. City
of Atlanta," the appellant alleged that the Atlanta City Council
violated the Open Meetings Act (the Act)' by omitting certain informa-

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Eagle West, 312 Ga. App. at 887, 720 S.E.2d at 321-22.
Id. at 888, 720 S.E.2d at 322-23.
Id. at 889, 720 S.E.2d at 323.
315 Ga. App. 521, 726 S.E.2d 714 (2012).
Id. at 523, 726 S.E.2d at 716.
Id. at 524, 726 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 529, 531, 726 S.E.2d at 720-21.
Id. at 531, 726 S.E.2d at 721.
Id. at 531-32, 726 S.E.2d at 721.
Id. at 533, 726 S.E.2d at 722.

44. 290 Ga. 521, 722 S.E.2d 732 (2012).
45. O.C.GA. tit. 50 ch. 14 (2009).
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tion from the meeting minutes.'6 Specifically, the meeting minutes
failed to list the names of those council ,members who voted in the
minority to amend certain council rules. 47 The trial court dismissed the
action and the court of appeals affirmed, holding the language of the Act
does not require such information be included in the minutes.'
Both courts interpreted the statute's plain language to provide that
the results of a non-unanimous; non-roll call vote must be presumed
unanimous unless the agency chooses to record the names of those
voting against the proposal or abstaining.4 9
The supreme court
disagreed, holding that the statute's silence on the issue requires further
review of the legislative intent and purpose of the law."0 The court
stated the Act "was enacted in the public interest to protect the
public-both individuals and the public generally-from 'closed door'
politics and the potential abuse of individuals and the misuse of power
such policies entail."' The Act enables both public access to meetings
and openness of records through the publication of meeting minutes
where members of the public are unable to attend such meetings.52 To
allow the agency discretion to not record the names of members voting
against a proposal or abstaining would prevent public access to
information to those who did not attend the meeting.5 8 This, the court
stated, would be contrary to the clear legislative intent of the Open
Meetings Act. 4 As such, the supreme court held that the statute
requires meeting minutes for non-roll call votes to record the names of
those voting against the proposal or abstaining.55
Writing for the dissent, Justice Melton argued that under the rules of
statutory construction, the plain language of the statute prevails and
"makes clear that the minutes of an agency meeting need not include the
names of persons voting against a proposal or abstaining [in a non-roll
call vote] .
The statute provides that in a roll call vote the minutes
"must include the name of each person voting for or against [the]
proposal;" however, such a requirement is not included for non-roll call

46. Cardinale,290 Ga. at 521, 722 S.E.2d at 734.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 521-22, 722 S.E.2d at 734.
50. Id. at 523-24, 722 S.E.2d at 735.
51. Id. at 524, 722 S.E.2d at 735-36 (quoting Earth Res., LLC v. Morgan Cnty., 281 Ga.
396, 399, 638 S.E.2d 325, 328 (2005)).
52. Id. at 524, 722 S.E.2d at 736.
53. Id. at 524-25, 722 S.E.2d at 736.
54. Id. at 525, 722 S.E.2d at 736.
55. Id. at 525, 722 S.E.2d at 736-37.
56. Id. at 527, 722 S.E.2d at 737-38 (Melton, J., dissenting).
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votes.5" Because there is nothing confusing or ambiguous about the
statute, Justice Melton asserted the plain language applies and does not
require the minutes to include the names of members who vote against
or abstain in a non-roll call vote.5"
IV. DISCRETIONARY APPEAL PROCEDURES

In a rare collision of criminal and administrative law, the Georgia
Supreme Court decided for the first time whether O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39,' 9
which provides authority to courts to grant extensions of the deadline for
certain types of filings, 0 authorizes courts to extend the original thirtyday filing deadline for discretionary appeal applications.6 ' In Gable v.
State,62 the trial court granted the appellant's motion for an out-of-time
discretionary appeal because "[aippellant's counsel was ineffective in
failing to file a timely application.6 3 The decision was appealed to the
Georgia Court of Appeals, where the court held that "the trial court did
not have the authority to grant an out-of-time discretionary application"
and dismissed the application because it was not filed within the
required number of days of the original trial court order.64
Established precedent provides that "compliance with the statutory
deadline for filing a [discretionary] appeal is [required]" to give the
appellate court jurisdiction.65 However, the supreme court overturned
this precedent, holding that an appellate court has the authority to grant
an extension for discretionary appeal applications under O.C.G.A. § 5-639.66 In reviewing the text of the statute, Justice Nahmias determined

that a discretionary appeal fits within the statute's description and was
similar to the four types of filings for which extensions of time are
specifically permitted. 7 As Judge McFadden's treatise on appellate
practice points out, there was no discretionary appeal procedure in place
when the statute was enacted, and while such appeals were not added
to the list of items for which extensions are expressly allowed, they were

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 527-28, 722 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. at 528, 722 S.E.2d at 738.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39 (1995).
Id.
Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81, 81-82, 720 S.E.2d 170, 171 (2011).
290 Ga. 81, 720 S.E.2d 170 (2011).
Id. at 82, 720 S.E.2d at 171.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 85, 720 S.E.2d at 173.
Id. at 84, 720 S.E.2d at 173; see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39(a)(1)-(4).
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not added to the list for which extensions are expressly forbidden,
either.68
Unfortunately for the appellant, the court's reversal was not enough
to save his discretionary appeal application."
Under the court's
holding, the trial court does not have authority to grant an extension of
the discretionary appeal period. Only the appellate court may grant
such an extension. Moreover, the application was not filed within the
thirty-day period required in which the trial court may grant a
discretionary appeal."
Whether the appeal qualified as "discretionary" was the issue raised
by appellants in Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville7 The case arose from
a challenge to a rezoning decision by the City of Dawsonville (the
City)." The superior court granted the City summary judgment on
three of the nine counts, and the appellants filed a direct appeal.' The
supreme court initially dismissed the appeals "for failure to comply with
the discretionary appeal procedures of [O.C.G.A.] § 5-6-35." 75 On the
appellants'
motion for reconsideration, the court took another look at the
6
issue.1

As the court noted, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 requires "[a]ppeals from
decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of. . . state and local
administrative agencies" to be brought by application for discretionary
appeal.7 Appellants argued that the discretionary appeals procedure
is inapplicable because they sought review of an administrative zoning
decision, not an appeal to the superior court under the City's zoning
ordinance. 8 The supreme court clarified that the statute "is not
limited to 'appeals' to the superior court but instead applies to appeals
from the superior court's 'reviewU' of an administrative agency decision,
[however that] judicial review is sought." 9 While the appellants also
argued "that they were not 'parties' to the administrative proceeding[s]"

68. Gable, 290 Ga. at 83-84, 720 S.E.2d at 172; see also CHRISTOPHER J. MCFADDEN ET
AL., GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 19:3, at 550 n.6 (2011-2012 ed.).
69. Gable, 290 Ga. at 85, 720 S.E.2d at 173.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 291 Ga. 124, 124, 728 S.E.2d 197, 198 (2012).
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 (1995).
76.
77.
78.
79.

Hamryka, 291 Ga. at 124, 728 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 125, 728 S.E.2d at 198 (alteration in original); see also O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1).
Hamryka, 291 Ga. at 125, 728 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 125, 728 S.E.2d at 198-99 (alteration in original); see also O.C.G. § 5-6-

35(a)(1).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

20121

and therefore not subject to the statute, this issue was easily dismissed
by the court because "administrative proceedings may not formally name
many of those who are legally entitled to raise issues with the administrative agency and then have standing to seek review of the administrative decision in superior court.' s
Because the appeal resulted from a challenge to an administrative
proceeding that was heard and ruled on by the superior court, the court
determined the appeal qualified as discretionary under the statute."'
Since the appellants failed to comply with the discretionary appeal
procedures, the appeal was dismissed. 2
V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY DECISIONS
Thurmond, 3 the Georgia Court of Appeals

In Teal v.
held that
hearsay evidence will not satisfy the "any competent evidence" standard."4 Sonja Teal was employed by Host International, Inc. to work
at a restaurant in the Atlanta airport.8 5 She was terminated when
Host alleged that she "failed to account for more than $50 that she
collected during a bartending shift ... [in] violation of Host's cashhandling policy. 8 6 Teal applied for unemployment benefits, but was
disqualified after the Board of Review of the Department of Labor
determined that she did not qualify for benefits, a decision later upheld
by the superior court."' The only evidence offered to prove Teal's
alleged violation of the employer's policy was the testimony of a "human
resources generalist, who apparently had no personal knowledge of any
of the facts surrounding the [cash-handling] incident."88

80. Hamryka, 291 Ga. at 125-26, 728 S.E.2d at 199.
81. Id. at 126-27, 728 S.E.2d at 199-200.
82. Id. at 127, 728 S.E.2d at 200.
83. 310 Ga. App. 312, 713 S.E.2d 436 (2011).
84. Id. at 313, 713 S.E.2d at 437.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 312-13, 713 S.E.2d at 436.
88. Id. at 314, 713 S.E.2d at 437. It is worth noting that the court did not look kindly
on the fact "that Host made no appearance and filed no brief" at the trial court level
despite an order directing the employer to do so. Id. at 313 n.2, 713 S.E.2d at 437 n.2. The
court also reiterated that the employer's choice of witness for the benefits hearing was a
poor one:
When asked by the hearing officer why the assistant store manager, "who actually
had knowledge of... how the.., overage occurred," was not available to testify,
Host's witness responded that she did not ask him to be at the hearing. The
witness later said that she wanted the store manager, who had personal
knowledge of the relevant events, to be present for the hearing, but he apparently
was not available.
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A Georgia court reviewing a decision of the Board regarding unemployment benefits will affirm the Board's decision if it is supported by any
competent evidence. 9 However, the court held that hearsay evidence
"is without probative value to establish any fact,"90 explaining that
"[t]estimony that someone else reported a discrepancy may be competent
to prove that the other person made the report, but when offered for the
truth of the matter asserted... it is the very definition of hearsay."9'
The court held that because no other piece of evidence in the administrative record sustained a finding that Teal had violated the employer's
policy, including testimony by Teal who denied the alleged violation, the
decision of the Board could not be sustained.9 2
The "any evidence" standard was evaluated in Brown Mechanical
Contractors,Inc. v. Maughon,9" when the court of appeals determined
that its role was not to supplant the fact-finding procedures of the AJ
when making a determination on disability benefits, adding that the
appropriate standard was "any evidence" as opposed to conducting a de
novo review.94 In that case, the Board rejected the employee's benefits
claim based on the following evidence: the employee only conducted 110
searches over 144 work days, failed to follow up with twenty-two
potential employers, failed to search for employment weeks at a time,
and lost employment on two separate occasions due to his need for
surgery, which he failed to schedule.95 The superior court overturned
the Board's decision and the court of appeals reversed. 96
The Georgia Court of Appeals stated that "neither the superior court
nor this [clourt has any authority to substitute itself as a fact[-]finding
body in lieu of the Board," and that its role was "not to return to the
[fact-]findings of the ALJ and examine whether that decision was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence, but [was] instead to
review the Board's award for the sole purpose of determining whether
its findings are supported by any record evidence."97 As such, the court
determined that the superior court's reversal of the Board's decision was

Id. at 314 n.4, 713 S.E.2d at 438 n.4.
89. Id. at 313, 713 S.E.2d at 437.
90. Id. (quoting Finch v. Caldwell, 155 Ga. App. 813, 815,273 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1980)).
91. Id. at 314, 713 S.E.2d at 437-38 (citing Citadel Corp. v. All-South Subcontractors,
217 Ga. App. 736, 738, 458 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1995)).
92. Id. at 315, 713 S.E.2d at 438.
93. 317 Ga. App. 106, 728 S.E.2d 757 (2012).
94. Id. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 760.
95. Id. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 758-59.
96. Id. at 107, 728 S.E.2d at 758.
97. Id. at 109,728 S.E.2d at 759-60 (quoting Master Craft Flooring v. Dunham, 308 Ga.
App. 430, 434, 708 S.E.2d 36, 40 (2011)).
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erroneous because evidence in the record supported the inferences and
factual findings made by the Board in its determination that Maughon
failed to conduct a diligent job search.9"
In yet another case dealing with the "any evidence" standard of review
in the context of a claim for unemployment benefits, the Georgia Court
of Appeals again showed deference to the fact-finding determinations of
the agency 'board. In McCauley v. Thurmond,99 Toni McCauley was
employed as a supp ort coordinator for Professional Case Management
Services of America. Her responsibilities included meeting with
individuals receiving Medicaid benefits on a monthly basis, conducting
needs assessments, and creating individual service plans. In November
2009, McCauley learned that she had tested positive for influenza, which
required that she be quarantined for five days. She notified her
supervisor that she was ill, that she would be traveling for the Thanksgiving holiday, and that she would return to work later that month.
However, McCauley failed to respond to her manager's request for a
meeting, failed to provide medical documentation, and did not respond
to the manager's inquiry into why McCauley would be traveling if she
was to be quarantined due to her illness. 1°'
After being discharged from her position, McCauley applied for
unemployment benefits, but was denied. The Georgia Department of
Labor determined that McCauley was not eligible by way of a claims
examiner's decision, which was affirmed by an administrative hearing
officer and the Board of Review.' 01 The superior court affirmed the
Department's findings, and the court stated that it would affirm if there
was "any evidence to support that ruling." 2 The court found evidence
in the record to support the Department's decision to disqualify
McCauley's benefits, because she was "fired for not following rules,
orders, or the instructions of [her] employer," based on her failure to
uphold her job duties or to communicate with her superiors.' 3
In the final case in this section, the "any evidence" standard was
blended, due to equity concerns, with the abuse of discretion standard.
In Coastal MarshlandsProtection Committee v. Altamaha Riverkeeper,
Inc.,1°4 the court examined the permit appeal process for a moveable

98. Id. at 110, 728 S.E.2d at 760.
99. 311 Ga. App. 636, 716 S.E.2d 733 (2011).
100. Id. at 636-37, 716 S.E.2d at 734-35.
101. Id. at 636, 716 S.E.2d at 734.
102. Id. (quoting MCG Health, Inc. v. Whitfield, 302 Ga. App. 408,408,690 S.E.2d 659,
659 (2010)).
103. Id. at 639, 716 S.E.2d at 736 (alteration in original).
104. 315 Ga. App. 510, 726 S.E.2d 539 (2012).
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floating dock over a marshland. In that case, the Coastal Marshlands
Protection Committee issued a permit allowing for the construction of a
community dock over marshlands on the South Newport River.
Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. (Riverkeeper) later sought review by an
AIJ.'0 5 The ALJ conducted hearings and issued a 17-page de novo
decision affirming the Committee's approval of the permit."° Riverkeeper appealed to the superior court, which concluded that though "the
factual determinations made by the [AJ] are supported by some
evidence in the record," °7
the AI's refusal to consider whether the Committee's decision to issue
a permit was supported by sufficient evidence... allow[ed] no grounds
for challenging a permit other than a violation of the authorizing
statute ...[creating] an irrebuttable presumption that all permits
have been issued pursuant to a proper exercise of discretion and a valid
process. l08

The superior court continued, "[a] permit may be wrongfully issued even
though once issued it does not violate its authorizing statute or related
regulations." 109
The Georgia Court of Appeals began by conducting a de novo review,
examining the Coastal Marshlands Protection Act of 1970,110 which
provides: "Applicants seeking a permit must 'demonstrate to the
[Clommittee that the proposed alteration is not contrary to the public
interest and that no feasible alternative sites exist.'"''
On appeal,
any aggrieved party then has the burden of proof "to show that the
permit was wrongfully issued.""2
The court held that the ALJ was required to "make an independent
determination of whether the permit would violate the provisions of the
applicable statute or regulations.""' In this case, the AL's order
showed careful consideration and analysis of all available evidence to
reach the required independent determination "that there was 'no
credible evidence that the proposed dock' would be contrary to the public

105. Id. at 510-11, 726 S.E.2d at 541.
106. Id. at 511, 726 S.E.2d at 541.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-280 to -297 (2012).
111. Coastal Marshlands, 315 Ga. App. at 511-12, 726 S.E.2d at 524 (alteration in
original); see also O.C.GA § 12-5-286(h).
112. Coastal Marshlands,315 Ga. App. at 513, 726 S.E.2d at 542 (quoting Hughey v.
Gwinnett Cnty., 278 Ga. 740, 741, 609 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2004)).
113. Id. at 514, 726 S.E.2d at 543 (emphasis added).
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interest or that a feasible alternative site existed."" 4 Therefore,
whereas the superior court's analysis focused on reviewing the AU's
finding and whether "they were supported by some evidence.. . in the
hearing before the Committee," the court of appeals held that "what
evidence was presented to the Committee is irrelevant... [rather,] [t]he
proper issue for the Superior Court was whether there was enough
evidence at the hearing before the ALJ.""5 Because there was some
evidence before the ALJ, its decision should have been affirmed.'16
The court continued that the analysis for the superior court remains
"whether the permit was wrongfully issued by the ALl ...

and not

whether the permit was wrongfully issued by the Committee.""" This
involvement by the superior court is "an appellate proceeding and not a
de novo trial,""' and the standard is "partly 'any evidence,' and partly
'abuse of discretion. ' "' 9 By way of explanation, "[t]he AL's findings
of fact must have been based on some evidence," but will be "overturned[,J even when supported by strong evidence," when the findings of
fact were based on an erroneous view of the law 2 ° The court ex2
plained this "part of an appellate decision is always, really, de novo."1 1
The abuse of discretion standard is used when the superior court
"reviews the ALJ's finding that the project is in the public interest."12
In this case, the court held that "[tihe Superior Court erred by focusing
on whether the Committee's decision was right or wrong" when it should
have focused on "whether the ALJ's decision was right or wrong." 1
The factual findings by the ALJ will stand if they are based on any
evidence, but the requirement "that the proposed project was in the
public interest, injects equity into the necessary decisions. "124 The
court held that where the ALJ or Committee added continuing obligations on the part of the permit-holder, such as gathering additional data
or monitoring post-construction changes to the marsh environment, such
information did not prove that the original decision-maker lacked
sufficient data to support its decision at the time the permit was

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
But see id. at 515, 726 S.E.2d at 544.
Id. at 514, 726 S.E.2d at 543.
Id. at 514, 726 S.E.2d at 544.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514-15, 726 S.E.2d at 544 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 515, 726 S.E.2d at 544 (emphasis added).
Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

issued.'25 As such, the court reversed the superior court's decision and
remanded to affirm the decision of the AL and Board of Natural
Resources.'26
VI. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Several of the cases in this year's Article addressed sovereign
immunity and, in particular, the distinction between ministerial and
discretionary acts. In Hendricks v. Dupree,2 ' the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling and granted summary judgment
in favor of a county roads superintendent in a case involving the
maintenance of the grass found on a county roadside." s In May 2007,
Dustin Dupree was injured after his all-terrain vehicle overturned after
striking a concrete culvert located on the shoulder of a county road. The
height of the grass on the road's shoulder hid the culvert. Though the
county roads department was responsible for maintaining the shoulder,
the grass had not been trimmed since the end of the previous year's
mowing season, and
the county was not scheduled to begin mowing
129
again for a month.
The county road superintendent testified that the county commission
did not provide detailed orders with regard to grass-cutting, that "[tihe
roads department had no manual directing the work," no policy
specifying the manner in which the grass was to be trimmed, no
requirements as to its height, and provided no training to its employees
relating to grass-cutting.'
Dupree relied on the holding in Mathis v.
Nelson, 3 ' in which the court provided that once a decision is made "to
engage in the work of keeping the road in repair, 'the actual progress of
such work by a local government is of a ministerial character, and...
the duties of a road supervisor in carrying out the physical details of the
work are likewise ministerial in nature."" 2 However, the court in this
case held that because no established policy existed to address "the
timing, manner[,] or method of execution of the cutting of the grass,"

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
at 642,

Id.
Id.
311 Ga. App. 96, 714 S.E.2d 739 (2011).
Id. at 96, 714 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 97, 714 S.E.2d at 740.
Id. at 98, 714 S.E.2d at 741.
79 Ga. App. 639, 54 S.E.2d 710 (1949).
Hendricks,311 Ga. App. at 97-98, 714 S.E.2d at 741 (quoting Mathis, 79 Ga. App.
54 S.E.2d at 713).
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Hendricks's actions were discretionary, and he was immune from
Dupree's injury claims. 3 3
That same court held that the discretionary exception would not cover
DOT operational inspections of roadways in Georgia Department of
Transportation v. Smith.' 34 In that case, Ernest and Irene Smith were
killed after a large oak tree fell on their vehicle." 5 The Smith family
alleged that "the tree in question.was hazardous; that it was growing on
the DOT's right of way; and that the DOT's employees were negligent in
failing to discover and remove [the tree] .
The DOT offered the argument that its tree inspection policy fell
within the "discretionary function" exception.' 37 The court, however,
rejected the DOT's argument, holding that the discretionary function
required the exercise of "policyjudgment in choosing among alternate
courses of action based upon a consideration of social, political, or
economic factors."" The factors are to cover only "basic governmental
policy decisions," whereas "the day-to-day operational decision of
whether and where to send out DOT personnel to inspect for road
hazards.., was not a basic governmental policy decision" and thus did
not qualify as a "discretionary function exception to the GTCA's waiver
of sovereign immunity."'39 Thus, the trial court did not err in failing
to grant the DOT's motions to dismiss the Smiths' claims. 40
In Spruill v. Georgia Department of Human Services,' the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that the Department's investigation into
allegations of malnourished twins was similarly not a discretionary
function. 42
The court reiterated that the discretionary function
exception applies only to policy decisions and that the caseworker's
"decisions regarding the investigation of the reported neglect and
malnourishment of the minor children, including his decision not to
visually inspect the condition of their bodies," did not satisfy that
standard. "

133. Id. at 99, 714 S.E.2d at 742.
134.

314 Ga. App. 412, 724 S.E.2d 430 (2012).

135. Id. at 412, 724 S.E.2d at 431.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 414, 724 S.E.2d at 432.
138. Id. at 414, 724 S.E.2d at 433 (quoting Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Miller, 300 Ga. App.
857, 859, 686 S.E.2d 455, 458 (2009)).
139. Id. at 414-15, 724 S.E.2d at 433 (quoting Miller, 300 Ga. App. at 859, 686 S.E.2d
at 459).
140. Id. at 415, 724 S.E.2d at 433.
141. 729 S.E.2d 654 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
142. Id. at 655.
143. Id. at 656.
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In Georgia Departmentof Corrections v. James,'" the court held that
a prison inmate injured on,a work detail failed to establish a waiver of
sovereign immunity for medical personnel employed at a county
prison' 6 because no evidence suggested that the DOC assumed the
right to control "the time, manner[,] and method of operating either the
[county's] work detail or the medical unit," and that the county
functioned as an independent contractor for which the state had not
waived sovereign immunity.'" Because the GTCA does not apply to
counties or independent contractors, the court held that James failed to
show that any tort was committed for which sovereign immunity was
waived. 147
In Kyle v. Georgia Lottery Corp.,'48 the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the Georgia Lottery Corporation was a state instrumentality
capable of asserting the defense of sovereign immunity. 149 George Kyle
sued for trademark infringement when he claimed that the Georgia
Lottery continued to use the mark for his game "MONEYBAG$" for a
longer period than Kyle had given permission.5 0 Kyle's game "consisted of a marked velvet pouch containing numbered tiles to assist in
randomly selecting numbers for lotto games."' 5' From 1995 to 2005,
In 2006, appellant
Kyle had sold less than fifty such games.'
obtained exclusive distribution rights to the game and sued the Georgia
Lottery for trademark infringement, seeking to recover all gross profits
the Georgia Lottery had gained from the sale of its MONEYBAG$ lottery
tickets for a three-year period, totaling around $5 million.' 58
The court began its analysis of the issue of sovereign immunity by
concluding first that, "[blecause sovereign immunity applies to state
instrumentalities, GLC is entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a
defense in this case." 154 In support of this determination, the court
cited two earleir decisions, Miller v. Georgia Ports Authority, 5 5 and
Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rodal Newton Community Service Board. 56

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

312 Ga. App. 190, 718 S.E.2d 55 (2011).
Id. at 190, 718 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 196, 718 S.E.2d at 60-61.
Id. at 196-97, 718 S.E.2d at 61.
290 Ga. 87, 718 S.E.2d 801 (2011).
Id. at 88, 718 S.E.2d at 802.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
266 Ga. 586, 470 S.E.2d 426 (1996).
273 Ga. 715, 545 S.E.2d 875 (2001); see also Kyle, 290 Ga. at 88, 718 S.E.2d at 802.
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In Miller, the court held that the Georgia Ports authority, as the state
administrative unit responsible for maintaining the state docks, is a
state agency entitled to sovereign immunity."7 Using this framework,
the court in Kyle observed that Georgia Lottery was established by state
law for the purpose of generating educational funds and was "indelibly
intertwined with the State in a manner that qualifies it for the
*protection of sovereign immunity as a State instrumentality." 8 ' In its
opinion, the court also invalidated its prior analysis in Thomas v.
6 9 as
Hospital Authority of Clarke County"
that decision predated both
Miller and relied
on
authority
given
prior
to
the 1991 amendment and
160
the GTCA.
In other noteworthy cases, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the GTCA under the 1991 amendment to the Constitution of the
State of Georgia in Wilcox v. Fenn, 6 ' a case that challenged the
constitutionality of the legislature's failure to extend the waiver to
counties or their officers or employees.'6 2 Also, in Strength v.
Lovett,'6 ' the court of appeals reaffired its reasoning in McCobb v.
Clayton County,'" in which it held that "a claim that an officer acted
with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures in
pursuing a fleeing suspect comes within the ambit of claims for negligent
use of a city- or county-owned motor vehicle."6 5
VII.

RECENT LEGISLATION

Legislative activity affecting administrative agencies was on the rise
at the 2012 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly. This may
be due to a slight improvement in the state's financial condition, coupled
with a greater familiarity by the current administration regarding
executive branch operations. Among the more noteworthy enactments
were the following.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Miller, 266 Ga. at 588, 470 S.E.2d at 428.
Kyle, 290 Ga. at 91, 718 S.E.2d at 804.
264 Ga. 40, 440 S.E.2d 195 (1994).
Kyle, 290 Ga. at 91, 718 S.E.2d at 804.
289 Ga. 750, 716 S.E.2d 144 (2011).
Id. at 752, 716 S.E.2d at 145.

163. 311 Ga. App. 35, 714 S.E.2d 723 (2011).
164. 309 Ga. App. 217, 710 S.E.2d 207 (2011).
165. Id. at 221, 710 S.E.2d at 211; Strength, 311 Ga. App. at 38-39, 714 S.E.2d at 726-

27.
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1. The Commissioner of Agriculture may require a surety bond to be
posted for a monetary penalty imposed upon 1a66 person because of a
consent order or a final administrative decision.
2. In administrative proceedings, the Commissioner of Agriculture is
mandated to render a final decision not more than thirty days from the
date of an application for final agency review. 7
3. The certifying agency for seed, plant, and variety certification and
labeling will be immune from liability just as state officers and
employees."6
4. The director of the Environmental Protection Division must now
develop and implement procedures for the processing of applications for
the issuance or renewal of permits or variances." 9
5. Aviation assets from the Georgia Aviation Authority, and the
transfer of personnel, are authorized for the Department of Natural
Resources, the State Forestry Commission, and the Department of
Transportation. 7 0
6. The State Commission on Family Violence now has a provision for
each member to serve until a successor is appointed.'
7. The State Board of Education is mandated to promulgate rules to
maximize the number of students taking at least one online course.'
8. A school health nurse is provided for every 750 students at the
elementary school level and for every 1,500 students at middle and high
schools.' 73 There is established within the Department of Education a
school health nurse program coordinator.'

166. Ga. S. Bill 367 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 2-2-9.1 (Supp. 2012))
(amending O.C.GA § 2-2-9.1 (2000)).
167. Ga. H.R. Bill 746 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 2-2-9.1 (Supp. 2012))
(amending O.C.GA. § 2-2-9.1 (Supp. 2012)).
168. Ga. S. Bill 390 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA § 2-11-52 (Supp. 2012))
(amending O.C.GA § 2-11-52 (2000)).
169. Ga. S. Bill 427 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA. § 12-2-2 (2012)) (amending
O.C.G.A. § 12-2-2 (2012)).
170. Ga. S. Bill 339 §§ 1-3, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA §§ 6-5-4 (Supp. 2012), 12-211 (2012), 12-6-25 (2012)) (amending O.C.GA. § 6-5-4 (Supp. 2012), and enacting O.C.G.A.
§§ 12-2-11 and 12-6-25 (2012)).
171. Ga. H.R. Bill 733 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 19-13-32(c) (Supp. 2012))
(amending O.C.GA. § 19-13-32 (2010)).
172. Ga. S. Bill 289 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-2-140.1 (2012)) (enacting
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-140.1 (2012)).
173. Ga. S. Bill 403 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-2-186 (2012)) (amending
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-186 (2012)).
174. Id. § 3 (codified at O.C.G. § 20-2-771.2 (2012)) (amending O.C.GA. § 20-2-771.2
(2012)).
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Rules Task Force is created within the
9. A new Professional Learning
75
Department of Education.
10. The Department of Education is mandated to promulgate
guidelines 6so that school employees are trained to care for students with
diabetes.

17

1 77
11. The State Charter Schools Commission is created.
12. The Herty Advanced Materials Development Center is redesignated as the Georgia Southern University Herty Advanced Materials
to the Board of
Development Center and its governance is transferred
17
Regents of the University System of Georgia.
13. The Interstate Compact on Educational Opportunity for Military
79
Children is adopted and placed under the Department of Education.
14. In a shuffling of duties, the inspection and regulation of such items
as elevators, escalators, boilers, amusement rides, scaffolding, and
staging have been transferred from the Department of Labor to the
Safety Fire Commissioner' s°
15. The Georgia Trauma Care Network Commission now must report
annually to the General Assembly on its progress regarding a state-wide
trauma system.' 8 '
16. The Health Strategies Council and the Clinical Laboratory, Blood
Bank, and Tissue Bank Committee have been dissolved.'82
17. Provisions regarding the Georgia Life and Health Insurance
Guaranty Association have been extensively updated."zs

175. Ga. S. Bill 184 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA. § 20-2-201.1 (2012)) (enacting
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-201.1 (2012)).
176. Ga. H.R. Bill 879 § 2, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 20-2-779(2012)) (enacting
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-779 (2012)).
177. Ga. H.R. Bill 797 §§ 1, 2A, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-2080 to -2091
and O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2068.1 (2012)) (repealing and replacing O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-2080 to -2091
(2012) and amending O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2068.1 (2012)).
178. Ga. S. Bill 396 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified as O.C.G.A. § 20-3-73.3 (2012)) (amending
and redesignating O.C.G.A. §§ 12-6-130, -131 (2012) and repealing O.C.GA. §§ 12-6-132
to -139 (2012)).
179. Ga. S. Bill 227 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified as O.C.G.A. tit. 20 ch. 17 (2012)) (enacting
O.C.G.A. § 20-17-1, -2 (2012)).
180. Ga. S. Bill 446 §§ 1-9, Reg. Sess. (codified as O.C.GA. tit. 25 ch. 15, O.C.GA. §§ 82-100 to -109.1 and 8-2-31 (Supp. 2012)) (amending and enacting tit. 25 ch. 15 (Supp. 2012)
and amending and redesignating O.C.G.A. tits. & chs. 8-2 (2004), 34-1, 34-11, 34-12, and
34-13 (2008)).
181. Ga. S. Bill 489 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 31-11-103 (2012)) (amending
O.C.GA. § 31-11-103 (2012)).
182. Ga. S. Bill 407 §§ 1, 2, Reg. Sess. (repealing O.C.G.A. §§ 31-6-20 and 31-22-3
(2012)).
183. Ga. H.R. Bill 786 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 33 ch. 38 (Supp. 2012))
(amending O.C.GA. §§ 33-38-1 to -22 (2005)).
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18. The State Board of Workers' Compensation has been empowered
to waive financial penalties assessed against an employer for the
inability to pay benefits if such is due to conditions beyond the control
of the employer.'
19. The Georgia Work Ready program has been dissolved and the
Georgia Workforce Investment Board provisions have been extensively
revised to include within the Board's power the ability to promulgate
rules and regulations."8
20. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation is now required to gather
information regarding sex offenders and report the same to the Sexual
Offender Registration Review Board."8
21. Zoning proposal review procedures have been repealed.' s
22. The regulation of motor carriers and limousine carriers has been
transferred from the Public Service Commission to the Department of
Public Safety.188
23. Music therapists must now become licensed and comply with a
regulatory framework.' 9
24. There is no longer a State Personnel Administration, as its
functions have been transferred to the Department of Administrative
Services.9 ° The repeal also necessitated an additional enactment to
assure that references throughout the Code were changed correctly. 1 '
25. The Board of Trustees of the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit
Fund has been granted the power to employ a hearing officer for its
administrative cases. 92

184. Ga. H.R. Bill 971 § 2, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA. § 34-9-221 (Supp. 2012))
(amending O.C.GA. § 34-9-221(f) (2008)).
185. Ga. H.R. Bill 897 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 34-14-1 to -3 (Supp.
2012)) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 34-14-1 to -3 and repealing O.C.GA. §§ 34-14-4 and 34-14-5
(Supp. 2012)).
186. Ga. H.R. Bill 895 §§ 1-3, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 35-3-4 (2012) and 42-113 to -14 (Supp. 2012)) (amending O.C.GA §§ 35-3-4 (2012), 42-1-13, and 42-1-14 (Supp.
2012)).
187. Ga. H.R. Bill 1089 § 1, Reg. Sess. (repealing O.C.GA. tit. 36 ch. 67 (2012)).
188. Ga. H.R. Bill 865 §§ 1-26, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 40-1-50 to -57, 40-1100 to -130, 40-1-150 to -170 (Supp. 2012) and scattered sections of O.C.GA.) (modifying
and repealing scattered sections of O.C.GA).
189. Ga. S. Bill 414 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 43 ch. 25A (Supp. 2012))
(amending O.C.GA. tit. 43 (2011)).
190. Ga. H.R. Bill 642 §§ 1-1 through 2-111, Reg. Sess. (codified primarily in O.C.G.
tit. 45 ch. 20 (Supp. 2012) but also contained in scattered provisions of the O.C.G.A.)
(amending scattered provisions of the O.C.G.A.).
191. Ga. H.R. Bill 805 §§ 1-12, Reg. Sess. (codified in scattered provisions of O.C.GA
tit. 47 (Supp. 2012)) (amending scattered provisions of O.C.G.A. tit. 47 (2002)).
192. Ga. H.R. Bill 928 §§ 1-2, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 47-17-27 and 47-17-81
(Supp. 2012)) (enacting O.C.GA § 47-17-27 (Supp. 2012) and amending O.C.GA. § 47-17-

2012]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

26. The Department of Revenue now has statutes prescribing how it
must handle letter rulings,, The Commisqioner may promulgate rules
and regulations regarding the same. 193
27. The Georgia Vocational Rehabilitation Services Board and the
Georgia Vocational Rehabilitation Agency are created.'9
28. The old Comptroller General duties are shifted from the Commissioner of Insurance to the State Accounting Office. 195
29. In a one-paragraph enactment, all state agencies are mandated to
prepare an annual report detailing federal government mandates that
require agency rules and regulations as opposed to the enactment of
laws by the General Assembly.'
30. Among other provisions, there is now a statutorily created Georgia
Tax Tribunal assigned as a division of the Office of State Administrative
197
Hearings.
31. The open meetings and open records provisions have been
comprehensively updated and revised.'

81 (2010)).
193. Ga. H.R. Bill 846 §§ 1-3, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 48-2-15.2, 48-2-55, and
48-3-7 (Supp. 2012)) (enacting O.C.G.A. § 48-2-15.2 (Supp. 2012) and amending O.C.G.A.
§§ 48-2-55 and 48-3-7 (2010)).
194. Ga. H.R. Bill 1146 §§ 1-8, Reg. Sess. (codified primarily at O.C.G.A. tit. 49 ch. 9
(Supp. 2012) and scattered sections of the O.C.G.A.) (amending and redesignating tit. 34
ch. 15 (2008), enacting O.C.G.A tit. 49 ch. 9 (Supp. 2012), and amending scattered sections
of the O.C.GA).
195. Ga. S. Bill 343 §§ 1-5, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 50 ch. 5B, §§ 45-14-3 and
45-14-5 (Supp. 2012)) (enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 50-5B-20 to -24, amending O.C.G.A. §§ 45-14-3
and -5 (2002), and repealing O.C.GA. §§ 45-14-20 to -23 (2002)).
196. Ga. S. Bill 428 § 1, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 50-13-4.1 (Supp. 2012))
(enacting O.C.GA. § 50-13-4.1 (Supp. 2012)).
197. Ga. H.R. Bill 100 § 15, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G. tit. 50 ch. 13A (Supp.
2012)) (enacting same (Supp. 2012)).
198. Ga. H.R. Bill 397 §§ 1-17, Reg. Sess. (codified primarily at O.C.G.A. §§ 50-14-1 to
-6 and 50-18-70 to -77 (Supp. 2012), along with scattered provisions of the O.C.G.A.)
(amending O.C.GA. §§ 50-14-1 to -6, 50-18-70 to -77 (2009), and scattered provisions of the
O.C.GA).

